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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment commenced by Plaintiffs 
and Respondents (hereinafter plaintiffs) pursuant to Section 78-33-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, seeking a declaration of the constitutionality 
of section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, insofar as it exempts the 
legislature, its committees, members and employees from the requirement 
that travel outside the State be pre-approved by the defendants and appellants 
(hereinafter defendants or board), and further that the Constitution of 
Utah precludes the executive from limiting, monitoring or otherwise inter-
fering with legislative expenditures, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants' motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim came on for hearing upon an agreed 
statement of facts on January 28, 1976. The court granted plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on March 10, 1976, and ordered the payment of 
plaintiffs' travel expenses. In so acting, the court denied defendants' 
motion to dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmation of the judgment and order in their favor. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set forth in defendants' Brief accurately 
states the facts agreed upon by the parties and upon which the lower court 
based its decision. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
INDULGENCE OF THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGISLATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIRES THAT THE EXCEPTION 
TO PRIOR APPROVAL OF OUT-OF-STATE TRAVEL SET 
FORTH IN SECTION 63-2-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, BE DECLARED CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Article VII, Sec. 13, Constitution of Utah, provides: 
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary 
of State and Attorney General shall constitute a Board 
of State Prison Commissioners, which Board shall have 
such supervision of all matters connected with the 
State Prison as may be provided by law. They shall, also, 
constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to examine 
all claims against the State except salaries or compensation 
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other duties 
as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the 
State, except for salaries and compensation of officers 
fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the Legislature 
without having been considered and acted upon by the 
said Board of Examiners." (Emphasis added.) 
Through enactment of section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
the legislature in pursuance of the authority granted it by Article VII, 
Sec. 13, Constitution of Utah, conferred an additional duty upon the board 
of examiners and its administrative functionary, the department of finance. 
Its duty under the subject section is to promulgate rules and regulations 
for travel and travel expenses based upon per diem, mileage and reimburse-
ment. Subsection (3) directs that "No obligation shall be incurred for 
travel outside the state without the advance approval of the board of 
examiners through the director of finance..."; but it also specifies that 
"... this section shall not apply to the legislature, its committees, or 
any member or employee of same." 
Former section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, (declared unconstitu-
tional by this court in Toronto v, Clyde, 15 Utah 2d 403, 393 R2d 795 (1964), 
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insofar as it purported to lodge final authority to approve mileage and 
travel expenses in the governor and director of finance); likewise, exempted 
the legislature from its strictures. It provided, in pertinent part that 
"...this provision shall not apply to the legislature, legislative 
committees or members and employees of the legislative counsel." 
The rejection of plaintiffs1 claims for reimbursement for actual 
and necessary travel based upon their failure to obtain advance "...certifi-
cation as to the availability of funds ..." and an advance determination of 
"...necessity and desireability..." clearly contravenes the express language 
of section 63-2-15 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953. While defendants 
readily concede that plaintiffs' travel was accomplished in accordance 
with the travel policy adopted by the legislative management committee 
which presumably conforms with the budgetary limitations imposed upon 
the committee by section 36-12-7 (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953; and that 
the board has traditionally and customarily apprbved and acquiesced in the 
practice of approving legislative travel expenses in a perfunctory manner 
absent prior approval; they deny any authority in the legislature to incur 
indebtedness or make expenditures without defendants' approval. Yet, in 
this jurisdiction, as in others, it is settled that legislative enactments 
are entitled to e^ery constitutional indulgence and should not be declared 
otherwise unless an irreconcilable conflict stands between the enactment 
and its constitutional counterpart. Newcomb vs. Ogden City, 121 Utah 503, 
243 P.2d 941 (1952); Salt Lake City vs. Perkins, 9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d 1106 
(1959); Trade Commission vs. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 
P.2d 958 (1968). No such conflict stands in this action. Little doubt the 
framers of Article VII, Sec. 13, envisioned the executive better able than 
the legislature to determine the availability of funds and the propriety of 
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claims because of its responsibility to daily run the government, but 
considerably more doubt exists about whether they ever intended the executive 
to exercise control over legislative expenditures., 
Payment of claims against the state necessarily requires the expenditure 
of public funds and the responsibility for the allocation or appropriation 
of public funds rests solely with the legislature. The drafters of our 
Constitution recognized this final authority to control the "purse strings" 
when they included the proviso in Sec. 13, that "...no claim against the 
State... shall be passed upon by the legislature without having been 
considered and acted upon..." by the board. The provision was included to 
make it clear that the legislature not the board has the final say about 
the expenditure of public money. 
POINT II 
LONG ACQUIESCENCE IN A PRACTICE UNDER A STATUTE 
IS A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE 
STATUTE'S VALIDITY, 
Until the action which precipitated this suit, the board has never 
construed its power under Sec. 13, to include control over internal 
legislative expenditures. (R-2). On the contrary, it has without question 
approved the payment of legislative travel expenses in reliance 
upon the legislative exception contained in section 63-2-15, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. (R-2). While past practice is not dispositive of the issue 
of constitutionality, this court has held that where doubt or uncertainty 
exists concerning the validity of a statute "...the experience and 
actual operation in the area in question are factors which may properly 
be considered in determining its validity." (concurring opinion 
Justice Crockett) State Board of Education vs. State Board of Higher 
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Education, 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1193 (1973). There, this court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Board of Higher Education Act based 
upon "...the long interpretation of Article X, Sections 2 and 8, by the 
legislature, with the acquiescence of the people, as well as the State Board 
of Education, and the administrators of the institutions of higher learning...". 
The long standing policy of the board to routinely approve the out-
of-state travel vouchers of legislators without prior approval both under 
the State Finance Act enacted in 1941, and under the present provisions of 
section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, enacted in 1963, weigh in favor 
of the validity of the exception in section 63-2-15. 
POINT III 
ARTICLE VII, SEC. 13, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, DOES NOT 
CONTEMPLATE THE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE FISCAL CONTROL 
OVER LEGISLATIVE EXPENDITURES. 
While this court has held that mandamus will lie to compel the 
board to audit and approve claims submitted pursuant to legislative 
enactment, Thoreson vs. State Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 57 Pac. 175 
(1899); that the board is not required to approve payment of a claim which is 
not properly grounded under the law, Marioneaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 
Pac. 355 (1907); that the board may not arbitrarily refuse to approve a 
claim which is just, authorized by law, presented in due form, and about which 
no factual dispute exists, State ex rel. Davis vs. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 
Pac. 1071 (1908); and that the framers of Sec. 13, Article VII, intended to 
give broad and sweeping powers to the board to examine the advisability and 
necessity of any disbursement or proposed obligation of the state, State ex. 
rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908); Bateman vs. Board of 
Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958), Toronto vs. Clyde, 15 Utah 
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2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964); it has neyer passed directly upon whether 
the power of the board to examine claims extends, if at all, to an examina-
tion of the propriety of internal legislative expenditures. 
Article V, Sec. 1 of our fundamental law provides: 
"The powers of government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, 
the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged 
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining 
to either of the others, except in cases herein expressly 
permitted.'1 
This court in Wood vs. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962), 
affirmed the importance of safeguarding clear lines of demarcation and 
function between the components of our tripartite system of government. 
Observed the court at page 362 of the Utah report: 
"It is also pertinent to observe that if one of the 
executive officers constituting the Board could 
circumvent legislative action by refusing to pay 
out funds appropriated to pay such a claim, problems 
would arise in determining how far actions of that 
character could extend; and may well result in 
perplexities relating to the balance of power between 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our 
state government. These departments, though to a 
degree interrelated and cooperating in the overall 
functions of government, have separate powers which 
should be safeguarded in order to preserve this 
balance which has always been recognized to be one 
of the advantages of our system. In case of doubt or 
uncertainty on a problem such as here exists, we think 
it wise and desirable to adopt an interpretation of the 
law and to follow a policy which will fit harmoniously 
into and sustain that balance rather than to choose 
an alternative which would provide a foundation for 
disrupting it. 
There is another principle which bears upon the question 
here under consideration. Our Legislature is directly 
representative of the people of the sovereign state, 
and thus has-inherently all of the powers of government 
except as otherwise specified by the State Constitution. 
By way of comparison, it is significantly different in 
that respect from the federal government, which is a 
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government of limited powers that can properly do 
only those things within the scope of the povj/ers 
expressly granted to it by the states through the 
Federal Constitution; whereas, the State Legislature, 
having the residuum of governmental power, does not 
look to the State Constitution for the grant of its 
powers, but that Constitution only sets forth the 
limitations on its authority. Therefore, it can do any 
act or perform any function of government not specifically 
prohibited by the State Constitution. In order to justify 
a conclusion that the power to approve and pay such 
claims has been taken away from the Legislature and 
placed exclusively within the control of the Board of 
Examiners, it would have to clearly so appear, which is 
not the case here." 
Although this court has rejected the notion that the framers intended 
Sec. 13 to be subject in its entirety to future legislation, Bateman, 
supra, it has recognized that the fundamental power of government is based 
to a considerable extent in the legislature. Parkinson v. Watson, 4 Utah 
2d 191, 291 P.2d 400 (1955); Bateman, supra. 
The proviso in Sec. 13 that "...no claims shall be passed upon by 
the legislature without having been considered ancj acted upon by the said 
Board of Examiners..." lends further credence to the proposition that the 
state constitutional fathers intended to ultimately rest the state's fiscal 
policy with the legislature. 
At issue in Budge, supra, was the meaning to be accorded the "legislative 
passage on claims" proviso in Sec. 13 of Article VII. This court concluded 
it meant that board action was not intended to be so final and absolute as 
to preclude further legislative action. 
"We can perceive no other meaning than that after 
the Board has performed its duty of examining and acting 
upon such claims, the Legislature may then 'pass upon' 
i.e., exercise its judgment upon them and take such action 
as it deems appropriate." (Utah report) 
"To decide otherwise would produce the illogical result 
of turning the subsequent presentation of claims...into an 
empty gesture whose only purpose would be to rubber-stamp 
the action of the Board." (Utah report) 
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It is certain from Budge, supra, that the boardfs power to examine 
claims against the state is subject to legislative review. If it were 
otherwise, the executive would be engaged in the business of deciding how 
best to spend public funds—a function reserved exclusively by Article V 
of the Constitution to the legislature. 
While good reason no doubt abides the decision of the constitutional 
fathers to vest the state's constitutional officers with the "power to examine 
all claims against the state" in the first instance, to determine whether 
such claims are really against the state or simply a request for a gift 
called a "claim" or some other illegitimate petition for state funds, the 
vestment was neyer intended to extend to prior approval of legislative 
appropriations or to approval of internal legislative expenditures made 
from funds appropriated by the legislature from the public treasury to itself. 
As observed in Bateman, supra, one important function of the examiners 
"...is to investigate and act as a fact finder and advisor to the legislature 
on claims..." because it is better equipped than a part-time legislature to 
assay the daily affairs of government. However, its power to examine does 
not extend to "salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law" albeit 
that they are certainly claims against the state treasury. The reason for 
the exception contained in Article VII, Sec. 13, seems obvious. The legislature 
is vested with the exclusive power to appropriate public funds, including 
fixing by law the salaries and the compensation of state officers. Neither 
the executive nor the judiciary is endowed under our Constitution with original 
authority to question the wisdom or the amount of such appropriations. 
It is presumed that the legislature will exercise good faith and fiscal 
responsibility in its duties. Its spending wisdom is not, nor 
was it intended by Sec. 13 of Article VII to be, subject to executive surveillanc 
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The people, not the executive, sit in judgment of the prudence or folly 
of the legislature's fiscal acumen. 
It makes little sense to construe Sec. 13, Article VII to require 
the board to review expenditures made by the legislature for its own purposes 
in advance, or at all, for that matter, if as held in Budge, supra, the 
legislature is endowed with the final authority to accept or reject claims 
against the state. Such a construction of Sec. 13, imposes a needlessly time 
consuming and futileresponsibility upon the board since it is unlikely the 
legislature will seriously question or reject a claim incurred on its own 
account. 
The strictly mechanical interpretation of Article VII, Sec. 13, urged 
upon the court by defendants fails to recognize t^e fundamental purpose 
which underlies the "examination of claims by the board" proviso; namely, 
to act, as pointed out in Bateman, supra, as a fact finder and advisor 
to a part-time legislature concerning claims against the state. Such a 
purpose, needless to say, is without value when the claims to be scrutinized 
are incurred by the legislature which is in a more enlightened position than 
the board to determine and weigh the advantages, disadvantages, and 
advisability of its own expenditures. 
POINT IV 
RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ATTEST THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
DEPARTMENT FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF 
GOVERNMENT. 
Several constitutional amendments of recent origin attest the 
independence and complete autonomy of the legislative department from any 
fiscal or other surveillance by the executive department. Article VI, 
Sec. 31, approved by the voters November 7, 1972, provides: 
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"For attendance at meetings of interim committees 
established by law to function between legislative 
sessions, members of the Legislature shall 
receive additional per diem compensation and 
mileage at a rate not to exceed that provided in this 
Constitution for regular legislative sessions." 
Sec. 32 of the Article adopted on the same date provides: 
"The Legislature may appoint temporary or permanent 
nonmember employees for work during and between 
sessions, including independent legal counsel which 
shall provide and control all legal services for the 
Legislature except as the Legislature by law shall 
authorize performance thereof by the attorney general," 
Sec. 33 of Article VI also approved November 7, 1972, provides: 
"The Legislature shall appoint a legislative auditor to 
serve at its pleasure. The legislative auditor shall have 
authority to conduct audits of any funds, functions, and accounts 
in any branch, department, agency or political subdivision 
of this state and shall perform such other related duties 
as may be prescribed by the Legislature. He shall report 
to and be answerable only to the Legislature." 
These amendments contemplate autonomy in the legislature. It is 
given the power to attend interim committee meetings, yet the power claimed 
by the board in this action would give it the power to indirectly discourage 
attendance at such meetings through refusal to pay vouchers tendered for 
the payment of mileage. The legislature is given the power to appoint 
nonmember employees for work during and between sessions, yet the power claimed 
by the board would give it control over legislative hiring practices and 
the salaries paid. Finally, the legislature is given the power to appoint 
a legislative auditor to serve at its pleasure with authority to conduct 
audits and perform such other related duties as the legislature prescribes, 
yet the power claimed by the board would subject the appointment to executive 
scrutiny. Such vast power in the board clearly is not contemplated by 
Sec. 13, Article VII. 
-10-
CONCLUSION 
When the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative 
enactments is indulged; when the long adherence t^> the exception provided 
in section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, both before and after 
Toronto, supra, is considered; when the importance of the tripartite 
system of government with its attendant separation of powers is 
reviewed; when the rationale underlying the exception for salaries and 
compensation in Article VII, Sec. 13, is explored; when the principal 
purpose of the board in examining claims is assessed; and when the recent 
amendments to the Constitution are comtemplated; plaintiffs respectfully 
submit that the validity of the legislative exception contained in section 
63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, becomes patent and that it is not 
contrary to the state Constitution* 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
MELVIN E. LESLjE 
Genial Counsel 
CHAM 
nt General Counsel 
GARY E. ATKIN 
Staff Counsel 
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